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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
Reported security breaches over the last 3 years suggest that a large number of security 
procedures are not currently operating at full effectiveness. Security breaches have ranged 
from the loss of personal details of 25 million UK citizens to the disclosure of national 
security information assets. 
 
It is highly likely that the organisations involved in these security breaches performed risk 
assessments for their information assets and implemented a range of security controls to 
manage these risks, leading to the resulting residual risks being within acceptable risk 
appetites. But as investigations into security breaches have shown, these controls are often 
ignored, bypassed or incorrectly implemented [ICO07]. 
 
Organisations may not currently understand how ineffectively their security controls are 
being managed, resulting in higher levels of risk exposure through controls operating at 
below optimal effectiveness. By introducing real world effectiveness measurements into an 
organisation’s risk management activities, organisations can improve their understanding of 
their current risk exposure. 
 
Research 
We have found that a number of organisational issues exist with the use of security metrics 
in measuring control effectiveness, which can be summarised as follows: 
 
 Metrics that measure effectiveness can be difficult to define. 
 Resulting measurements can be difficult to interpret by non-security professionals. 
 Effectiveness metrics cannot be easily compared to allow benchmarking of an 
organisation’s performance. 
 
Our research has concluded that there is a gap in current IT governance models and 
management best practices for the definition of how to measure the effectiveness of 
security controls. While these standards do recognise the requirement for continual 
assessment of operational effectiveness, the definition of these measurements and how to 
interpret the results are left to the organisation.  
 
Information Security Effectiveness Framework (ISEF) 
This project introduces ISEF, a framework that assists organisations in defining, visualising 
and comparing security metrics.  
 
The framework uses the concept of grouping controls based on their implementation type 
and temporal objectives to present common characteristics that can be measured. The 
framework uses the relationship between controls and risks to align security metrics against 
organisational risk, and visualises these to support the direction of remedial efforts. 
 
The ISEF is designed to complement current IT governance models and standards such as 
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COBIT and ISO27002. This is provided by its alignment with these ‘what’ should be done 
models and standards by providing the ‘how’. 
 
The ISEF provides a method of comparing security metrics based on the financial stock 
markets indices. This allows the comparison of security control management between 
organisations and allows the organisations to benchmark themselves against peers without 
revealing specific security control information. 
 
Conclusion 
A case study using ISEF has shown that the framework provides a method for defining 
metrics in order to obtain real world data to modify current residual risk levels. For 
organisations with a risk management approach, the framework can visualise effectiveness 
in the context of risk allowing resources to be focused on improving security management 
where it will make the greatest risk reduction. 
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2 INTRODUCTION 
In response to the unprecedented security breaches of 2008, information security has 
become an important issue with the inevitable question being asked by management 
boards: how much risk are we currently exposed to? During the same year over 80% of UK 
large businesses reported information security as a high or very high priority [BERR08]. 
 
In many cases risk exposure is determined through risk assessment, as organisations 
regularly adopt a risk management approach to information security. One of the main 
problems commonly encountered with this method is the absence of real world data to give 
an insight into how effectively information security risks are currently being mitigated.  
 
Importantly, organisations may not understand how ineffectively their security controls are 
being managed, resulting in higher levels of risk exposure through controls operating at 
below optimal effectiveness. 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
At the heart of many information security activities is the use of a risk management 
approach. The 2008 Information Security Breaches Survey [BERR08] reported that 77% of 
large businesses and 48% of small businesses adopted this approach. 
 
A risk management approach aims to identify and assess risks to an organisation’s 
information assets and treat these risks with a number of security controls. The deployed 
security controls should be proportionate to the level of risk and should take into account 
the risk appetite of the organisation. ISO 27002 [ISO05] defines a risk management process 
as shown in Figure 1 – ISO 27002 risk management process. 
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A key principle within ISO27702 is that risk management activities should be a continuous 
process. This is crucial as the parameters for the initial risk assessment are in constant 
change. 
 
During the risk management process, the measurement of current security effectiveness is 
crucial in refining the organisations risk treatment activities. 
MANAGEMENT OF IT OPERATIONS 
Only a very few organisations are fully effective at managing their IT operations. Critically, an 
IT department’s portfolio includes a range of technical security controls which, by extension, 
are also not being run at full effectiveness. 
 
While security practitioners can define the theoretical risk exposure for an organisation 
based on risk assessment and risk reduction activities, without understanding how these risk 
reduction activities are actually implemented an organisation cannot know its actual risk 
exposure. To solve this problem, organisations have started looking at security metrics in 
order to measure the management of security activities. 
 
Initial risk level






Risk reduction when 
control is operating at 
100% effectiveness 
Initial risk level






Risk reduction when 
control is actually 
operating at 50% 
effectiveness 
Theoretical Risk Exposure Actual Risk Exposure
 
Figure 2 – Theoretical vs. actual risk exposure 
This activity is factored in the process of risk management as the continual reassessment of 
risks and measuring the current effectiveness of deployed controls as the threat and 
technological landscape changes. New vulnerabilities are found, controls bypassed and 
policy ignored. 
 
Understanding the effectiveness of security controls has been found to be crucial in a 
number of situations: 
  
 Organisations require an understanding of their current level of operational risk 
based on where security controls are ineffective 
 Security management programmes require a method of ensuring that security 
controls in place are operating correctly.  
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 Formal security management structures such as defined in ISO/IEC 27002:2005 and 
the UK Governments Manual of Protective Security (MPS), require an organisation to 
define how the effectiveness of implemented security controls are to be measured 
[ISO05] 
 Organisations require a method of comparing the effectiveness of their security 
management programme with others within an industry or between organisational 
groups 
 
In order to measure the effectiveness of security controls a set of metrics must be used. 
Defining, producing and presenting security metrics is seen as a difficult problem with the US 
Information Security Research Council placing the issue on the “Hard Problem List” allowing 
extra funding from the US Government [NIST09]. 
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3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
3.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In order to gain a complete and more accurate understanding of an organisation’s risk 
exposure, the effectiveness of its security controls need to be considered.  
 
Although organisations realise the need for security metrics to gain insight into control 
effectiveness, they are reluctant to produce these as the field has yet to mature, claiming 
security metrics are difficult to define, produce and present. 
 
This problem statement is based on a suggested research topic provided by KPMG to Royal 
Holloway, University of London. The research topic was originally suggested due to repeated 
experiences by KPMG clients regarding the issues with measuring the effectiveness of 
security controls. 
AIMS 
The aims of this project are to: 
 
 Identify the current business issues around preventing organisations producing 
security metrics 
 Identify and analyse the current information, tools and methodologies that currently 
exist to produce security metrics 
 Propose a framework that helps define, visualise and compare security metrics 
 Design and develop a security metrics reporting tool based on the framework 
PROJECT OUTLINE 
The project was conducted in four stages: 
 
 An initial research stage 
 A requirements definition stage using the results of the research 
 A framework development stage 
 A framework evaluation stage 
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4 RESEARCH 
In order to identify the issues and challenges surrounding the use of security metrics a 
number of research activities have been conducted. 
 
 It is recognised that other research on security metrics exist so a literature review of 
current information and tools on producing and reporting security metrics has been 
conducted.  
 
 In order to identify the business issues surrounding security metrics interviews with 
members of organisations that currently or are planning a security metrics 
programme have also been conducted. 
 
The analysis of the research activities will give a set of business issues and therefore design 
criteria that the proposed framework should meet. 
 
4.1 DEFINITIONS 
In order to discuss security metrics within the scope of this project, it is important to define a 




“At a high-level, metrics are quantifiable measurements of some aspect of a system or 
enterprise. For an entity (system, product, or other) for which security is a meaningful 
concept, there are some identifiable attributes that collectively characterize the security of 
that entity. Further, a security metric (or combination of security metrics) is a quantitative 
measure of how much of that attribute the entity possesses. A security metric can be built 
from lower-level physical measures.” [ISS08] 
 
For the purposes of this project a more concise definition is suggested: “A security metric is a 




“[A] means of managing risk, including policies, procedures, guidelines, practices or 





“[A] property or characteristic of an object that can be distinguished quantitatively or 
qualitatively by human or automated means” [ISO07] 
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Effectiveness 
 
“[The] ability to achieve stated goals or objectives, judged in terms of both output and 
impact” [EPA] 
Page 10 of 45 
4.2 CURRENT BUSINESS ISSUES 
To identify the current business issues surrounding security metrics, a number of structured 
interviews were performed with members of the security industry in both the public and 
private sectors. Interviews with other members of staff that consumed security metrics 
outside of the security field were also included in the interviews. 
4.2.1 INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY 
Two methods of obtaining the required information were compared, a paper questionnaire 
and a face-to-face interview. A face-to-face interview was chosen over a paper 
questionnaire. This allowed points raised by the participants to be focused and expanded on 
during the discussions. Any points raised on a paper questionnaire that needed expanding 




1.  Please describe your organisations approach to information security. 
2.  How many employees does your organisation employ? 
3.  Do you have a dedicated information security team? 
4.  Has your organisation implemented any IT management standards? 
5.  Does your organisation report on the current performance of your IT 
operations to senior management or external bodies? 
6.  What are the key drivers for producing performance reporting 
within your organisation? 
7.  Do these reporting activities include the performance of security 
measures, procedures or controls? 
8.  Please describe your experiences with measuring the performance 
of your operations. 
9.  Please describe how your organisation measures the performance or 
effectiveness of your security controls or procedures. 
10.  Has your organisation implemented any security management 
standards? 
11.  Does your organisation perform a risk management approach to 
information security? 
12.  Does your risk management activity take into consideration the 
results of your current performance reporting? 
13.  When determining the design of a security control, which 
characteristics do you include in your design? 
Table 1 - Interview questions 
Questions were provided to the interviewee before the interview to ensure the relevant 
information was at hand and also to identify if a more suitable individual was available. This 
was however used with caution as the role of the interviewee was crucial in determining the 
impartiality of the information obtained. For example, interviewing the person responsible 
for a security metrics project can give a different perspective (due to a possible conflict of 
interest) than the end customer of the projects results. 
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The use of open questioning was used so as not to bias the interview. For example, the 
interview topics did not just focus on issues with security metrics as this implies the 
organisation is currently experiencing issues.  
 
In order to allow the interviewees to be open and frank about their experiences the 
interviews were conducted under the appropriate confidentiality agreements and 
government legislation. Therefore specific results cannot be presented but the findings are 
presented in aggregate. 
4.3 INTERVIEW ANALYSIS  
The issues identified within the interview sessions were collated and grouped under the 
following main topics. 
  
Business Issues 
1.  Defining metrics 
2.  Metrics need to meet the requirements of different stakeholders 
3.  Metrics that are easily obtained are not meaningful 
4.  Cost of measurement 
5.  Metrics are misleading 
6.  The impact of what the metrics are showing is not understood by 
members outside of the security team 
7.  Metrics cannot be used to benchmark an organisation 
8.  Metrics should measure security controls at all layers of the 
organisation’s architecture 
9.  Qualitative metrics are subjective 
Table 2 - Business issues 
1 - Defining metrics 
 
A recurring theme within the interviews was the issue of how to identify which security 
characteristics should be measured as part of a metric programme. This issue almost always 
arises when the organisation attempts to define what is to be measured without first clearly 
defining what they wish to achieve. In contrast, if an organisation has a clearly defined set of 
objectives, such as to ensure regulatory compliance, the variables to measure became more 
apparent. 
 
The issue of defining metrics exists on two levels: which components of their security estate 
to measure, and how to measure those components. 
 
2 - Metrics need to meet the requirements of different stakeholders 
 
Different security stakeholders within an organisation have very different requirements and 
therefore require metrics to meet these. In some cases specific metrics need to be collected 
to meet a specific requirement, however in the majority of cases discussed these 
requirements could be met through the aggregation of other metrics.  
 
The classic example being that the CIO requires an organisational view and aggregated data 
rather than specific metrics of individual components. 
 
Page 12 of 45 
3 - Easily obtained metrics are not always meaningful 
 
While a number of metrics may already exist or can be easily obtained these may not always 
provide the data required to make meaningful conclusions. For example, an anti-virus 
management server may easily provide a metric on the number of clients with an up-to-date 
installation, but a potentially more important metric is the number of clients without any 
anti-virus installation. This second metric would be harder to obtain than just using the 
metric already provided by the management server but may give more meaningful results 
when determining the effectiveness of the anti-virus control. 
 
Jaquith suggests that there are two methods of defining and collecting metrics [JAQUITH07]. 
The top-down approach takes a question and then defines metrics that will directly answer 
this. This approach has the advantages that collected metrics always relate to a specific 
question required by the business and can provide more meaningful answers. The 
disadvantages of this approach are that defined metrics can be expensive to collect as they 
may not be readily available as in the anti-virus example. 
 
In contrast a bottom-up approach takes a set of available metrics and then analyses what 
conclusions can be derived from them. The advantages of this approach are that it uses 
metrics that are available and can be inexpensive to collect. The disadvantages of this are 
that metrics may not answer the question required and in the worst scenario may provide 
misleading answers if not viewed in the correct context. 
 
This method of defining the purpose of the programme before defining the individual 
metrics is a recommended approach in [NIST03], [ISO07]. 
 
4 - Cost of measurement 
 
The process of collecting metric data can be expensive if no automatic collection method 
exists. If the metric requires manual collection or inspection, for example with physical and 
procedural controls, then there can be substantial time cost. 
 
5, 6 - Metrics are misleading and misunderstood 
 
An identified problem with metric results was that without the true context for the 
measurement the metric could be misleading. This problem increased outside of an 
organisation’s security team, with many people misunderstanding the results of the metric. 
 
This is not surprising when working with a specialised area such as information security. 
People working outside of the information security area cannot be expected to have an 
intimate knowledge of different security controls and therefore cannot be expected to 
understand the impact of the metrics results. 
 
An example metric given within one interview was that no key management was being 
performed with the use of cryptography. The common misconception was that through the 
use of cryptography the risk of information disclosure from the theft of a portable device 
was being mitigated. Unless the metric was reported with its impact on the effectiveness of 
cryptography it was not a concern within the wider IT department. At the management level 
it was not until the metric was given the context of its impact on the organisations risk of 
information disclosure that it was accepted as an area requiring resource to rectify. In this 
example the metric had to be presented differently to be understood by the audience. 
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7 - Metrics cannot easily be used to benchmark an organisation 
 
One of the desired activities to perform once security metrics have been collected is to 
benchmark them against other organisations within the industry. For example, during 2008 
in the wake of the HMRC data loss the UK Government mandated that all departments 
undertake an exercise aimed at determining the effectiveness of their security procedures. 
The results of the exercise were submitted to a central department for collation and 
benchmarking. 
 
As the method for collecting and defining metrics differs across organisations, choosing 
metrics as benchmarks is difficult. For example, comparing how well the effectiveness of two 
organisations anti-virus is performing does not take into account the importance of the 
control to the organisation. If the organisation is operating a standalone network with no 
onward connections the risk mitigated by anti-virus could be smaller than an organisation 
with a connection to the internet.  
 
Any method of comparing effectiveness metrics should take into account the importance of 
the control to the organisation. 
 
8 - Metrics should measure security controls at all layers of the organisations architecture 
 
As organisations adopt formal architectures based on design principles such as a Service 
Orientated Architecture, metrics need to cover all layers within the architecture. Figure 3 - 
Example architecture shows an example Service Orientated Architecture and as security 
controls span a number of layers, metrics should not only be focused on system specific 
controls but should also measure against business processes. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Example architecture 
For example, measuring the effectiveness of a disaster recovery control by looking at the 
system level would not provide a complete picture. A single business process may be 
implemented as a number of systems owned by the organisation or third parties.  
 
In order to support security metrics that span many architectural layers, the framework 
must align against a property that transcends business processes. For example, 
organisational risk can cover a number of business processes and allows metrics to be 
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9 - Qualitative metrics are subjective 
 
A number of current security metrics implemented by those organisations interviewed were 
based on a qualitative scale and required an expert to make a decision on the controls 
current implementation. As this measurement is not based on the actual measurement of a 
tangible characteristic, the metrics are viewed with scepticism across the organisation. 
Results also varied depending on whom conducted the assessment leading to problems in 
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4.4 LITERATURE REVIEW   
The interview process identified a number of business issues that were used as assessment 
criteria for the literature review. 
4.4.1 KEY PUBLICATIONS - ISO27004 AND NIST 800-55 
One of the major developments in the field of security metrics is the creation of ISO27004 – 
“Information Security Management Measurement” [ISO09]. This has been in response to the 
difficulty experienced by organisations at measuring the effectiveness of their security 
management programmes. 
 
The ISO standard is currently in final committee draft and due for publication at the end of 
2009. This research was conducted on the final committee draft as it was the latest version 
available for public review during the research period. 
 
ISO27004 is designed to be used in conjunction with other standards within the ISO27000 
series and provides a method for measuring the effectiveness of the Information Security 
Management System (ISMS) created as part of ISO27002. Specifically ISO27002 requires 
management to “define how to measure the effectiveness of the selected controls or groups 
of controls and specify how these measures are to be used to assess control effectiveness to 
produce comparable and reproducible results” [ISO05]. 
 
The main topics of the standard define how a measurement programme should be managed 
and how a measurement model should be constructed. It is at this higher level that the 
standard is focused on “what” should be performed and less on the “how”. 
 
For a measurement model, it suggests that for every control within the measurement 
programme scope, a number of attributes should be identified and measured. While the 
standard does give examples of attributes for some controls, there is no methodology 
provided for determining these attributes. 
 
The standard also suggests ideas on how measurement results can be analysed and 
communicated to various stakeholders through the use of scorecards and operational 
dashboards but does not detail how to use these methods. 
 
The US National Institute for Science and Technology has released special publication 800-
55, “Computer Security - Security Metrics Guide for Information Technology Systems”.  
 
The publication provides comprehensive guidance on how a security metrics programme 
should be conducted ranging from how to ensure a programme will succeed to the types of 
metrics that can be collected.  
  
The publication specifies a number of metric types that can be collected including: 
 
 Business impact metrics 
 Effectiveness metrics 
 Process implementation metrics 
 
A metric development process is outlined and focuses on how the metrics should be 
managed, such as ensuring a stakeholder exists for a metric and frequency of collection but 
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the actual definition of the metric and the controls characteristic to be measured is left to 
the organisation. 
 
[NIST09] also suggests the use of a quantitative metric as qualitative human input is too 
subjective and measurements performed by different individuals cannot be accurately 
compared. 
4.4.2 IT MANAGEMENT BEST PRACTICES AND STANDARDS 
A number of IT management standards and collections of best practices exist to help with 
the governance of IT operations. The need for internal IT governance has increased as 
organisations realise that one of their most important assets is the information and 
technology that supports it.  
 
Since information assets have become more valuable, board level requirements to place IT 
operations under an internal control regime have increased. One of the key drivers in placing 
IT operations within an internal control structure is to allow the performance of the IT 
operations to be measured and reported to the organisation’s management board. 
 
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) 
 
COBIT provides an IT governance model that aids in the understanding and managing of IT 
risks and is currently in version 4.1. The model defines 34 processes that cover a variety of 
controls that state high level activities defining which aspects of the IT operations needs to 
be controlled. 
 
COBIT is designed to provide an organisation wide IT governance model and aligns with the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commissions (COSO) Internal 
Control – Integrated Framework [ITGI07]. 
 
The COSO framework focuses on the use of internal control to provide assurance in financial 
reporting, effectiveness of operations and compliance with laws and regulations. The 
development of the framework was in response to a number of high profile company 
failures such as Enron Corporation and highlighted the importance of financial reporting 
assurance [CUNNINGHAM05]. This also resulted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 defining 
that organisations must produce a report which “contain[s] an assessment […] of the 
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial 
reporting.” [SOX02]. As financial reporting is largely based on electronic information assets, 
technology controls around these assets are of particular importance and COBIT provides a 
model for assuring that these controls are being correctly managed. 
 
In the context of information security, COBIT is focused on ‘what’ needs to be governed 
rather than ‘how’. This is supported by [BS05] and [OGC08]. 
 
Within COBIT, measurement of IT operations and their effectiveness is provided as a 
maturity model and through the use of outcome and performance measures. The maturity 
model is focused on identifying the location of issues rather than adherence to control 
objectives [ITGI07]. 
 
COBIT uses a financial scale for quantifying business impacts. The use of a financial scale for 
some organisations such as the military and government is inappropriate as the value of the 
assets is measured in non-financial terms such as loss of life. 
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IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL) 
 
ITIL is a set of best practices related to the management, development and service delivery 
of IT infrastructure. 
 
ITIL is closely aligned with ISO 27002 and is focused on the definition of service level 
agreements for security controls. A service level agreement is defined by the security 
controls policy which states how the control should be operated. 
 
In contrast to COBIT, ITIL provides best practice guidance on how to implement the controls 
suggested in the COBIT model. Although ITIL provides a more detailed level of “how” it does 
not provide specifically how to measure if a security control is meeting its security policy, 
leaving this to the organisation. 
 
4.4.3 ADDITIONAL SECURITY METRIC ISSUES 
In addition to the business issues identified during the interview analysis, the following 
issues have been discussed in the literature reviewed. 
 
It has been suggested by [NEW08] and [GVIB01] that security metrics presented without 
context can lead to misdirected security investment. For example, a metric representing the 
number of security incidents could suggest that security controls in one particular area of 
the organisation are inadequate and financial investment could be directed to resolve this. 
However, the incidents reported within the metric could be having a small impact on the 
business and the diversion of security investment from other areas could lead to an incident 
with a greater impact occurring. In order to fully understand the incident response metric an 
appreciation of the incidents’ impact on the business must also be included to give the 
metric context before directing security investment. Collaborating views are also presented 
by [JAQUITH07], who suggest that as security metrics are not easily understood, non-
security professionals can misdirect security spending. 
4.4.4 CURRENT TOOLS 
STREAM  
 
STREAM is a commercial tool developed by Acurity Risk Management LLP. The STREAM tool 
includes methods of aligning effectiveness measurements against risks (via their relationship 
with controls) and provides a number of visualisation options.  
 
The tool allows for the reporting of an organisation’s current risk exposure and how this 
relates to its risk appetite. The information is presented in a graphical format via an 
information dashboard. 
 
In order for the tool to be flexible, it allows for an effectiveness value to be assigned to a 
security control but does not include a method to how the effectiveness should be 
measured. It allows the organisation to enter an effectiveness value of 0 to 100% but how 





Page 18 of 45 
IT Security Assessment Tool (ITSAT) 
 
The IT Security Assessment Tool is produced by Control Risks Group Limited and provides a 
method of determining how well an organisation is meeting a set of criteria such as 
compliance with ISO27002. It also measures the maturity of the organisation’s security 
regime against a predefined scale. This scale is based on the existence of a control, if the 
control has a written policy and if the control has been implemented. The tool does not 
involve measuring the control’s actual implementation but rather involves estimating the 
control’s maturity against defined criteria, using a scale of [None, Partial, Full]. 
4.5 LITERATURE ANALYSIS 
IT Governance Models and Standards 
 
Governing frameworks and management best practices researched as part of this project are 
designed to operate at different logical layers within an organisation. These can be 
summarised for the purpose of this analysis as 3 layers shown in Figure 4. At the highest 
level a governing framework can state objectives at a strategic level, for example stating that 
there should be internal control around the processes protecting sensitive financial 
information assets. How these objectives are met and which IT activities should be 
conducted is performed at the activity level with specific implementation guidance at the 





Figure 4 - Framework layers 
As shown in Figure 4 COBIT positions itself as a strategic IT governance model and measures 
the performance of IT processes through the use of performance indicators. These are 
defined at a process level and not a control level and therefore are not appropriate for the 
measuring the effectiveness of specific security controls. 
 
Although ITIL is positioned below COBIT, it still does not provide enough specific guidance 
for the use of security metrics. As [OGC08] shows, ITIL does not attempt to include security 
activities specifically but rather complements ISO 27002. 
 
In summary, the standards and governance models researched are aimed at organisational 
wide IT operations and therefore do not take into account the specific requirements of 
security components. As the models are not security specific they do not align against other 
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STREAM & ITSAT 
 
The tools analysed provide methods of visualisation and reporting effectiveness 
measurements but does not incorporate the security metrics required to perform these 
measurements. STREAM allows the organisation to assign an effectiveness value on a scale 
of 0-100 to a control but does not define how this value is calculated. Again with the ITSAT, 
the tool allows for the incorporation of an effectiveness value but this based on a level 
maturity scale that does not provide a metric that can be used to enhance residual risk 
levels. The process of determining the current maturity level is a subjective process as it is 
based on an ‘experts’ judgement and not actual measurement of an implemented control. 
 
4.5.1 COMPARISON  
As Table 3 shows, current tools or standards focus on either the high level activities of a 
security metrics programme, such as ISO and NIST, or the reporting and visualisation 
activities. This is to be expected given the intended usages for the tools and standards 
analysed. Standards and IT governance models such as NIST, ISO, COBIT are more focused on 
the ‘what’ needs to be controlled from a management board perspective rather than the 
‘how’. The ITSAT and STREAM tools are designed to be a reporting and visualisation tools 
used within a lager IT governance model and therefore do not focus on defining how to 
measure effectiveness. 
 
 ISO27004 NIST COBIT ITIL STREAM ITSAT 
Programme 
management 
Y Y Y Y   
Reporting  Y Y Y Y Y 
Visualisation     Y Y 
Effectiveness 
Benchmarking 
      
Metric 
Definition 
      
Table 3 - Comparison of current tools and literature 
This analysis suggests that there is a gap in current guidance in how to actually define 
metrics within a security metric programme. None of the standards or tools provides a 
method for defining the characteristics of controls to be measured. 
 
None of the current standards or tools provides a method for benchmarking an organisation 
against its industry peers. This is due to the absence of a common scale on which 
organisations can be benchmarked against. The closest to a common scale for benchmarking 
is provided by ITSAT as it measures compliance against a standard such as ISO27002 but this 
is not an effectiveness scale. 
 
One of the possible reasons the standards do not define specific metrics to be measured is 
due to the vast number of different controls implemented within an organisation. The 
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standard would soon become out of date as new controls are developed and in order, to 
stay valid over time they leave the low level definition to the organisation. This approach has 
lead to the main business issue discovered during the interview analysis, where 
organisations are unsure specifically how to define their metrics especially to measure 
effectiveness. 
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5 FRAMEWORK REQUIREMENTS 
Through analysis of the research conducted a number of design criteria for a framework 
have been established. 
 
Key Framework Requirements 
1.  Provide a method of defining security metrics 
2.  Provide a method of visualising metrics 
3.  Provide a method of benchmarking metrics 
Sub Framework Requirements 
4.  Framework must be positioned to align with other governance 
models and management standards 
5.  Metrics need to be reported with context 
6.  If aligned against risk, the framework must be compatible with 
any risk assessment methodology 
7.  Metrics must be quantitative 
8.  Provide different viewpoints for different parts of the organisation 
9.  Top-down metric definition to ensure metrics are meaningful 
Table 4 – Framework requirements 
1. Definition Process 
 
One of the main business issues identified during the research was how to define metrics. 
Defining metrics is the process of deciding which characteristics of a security control to 
measure. Particularly which characteristics can be measured that result in a measure of 
effectiveness. The framework must provide a method for identifying characteristics to 
measure for different security controls. Ideally these should be generic enough to apply to 





As consumers of security metrics reside outside of the organisations security team, the 
metrics must be visualised so they can be presented in an aggregated format for 




As well as understanding effectiveness of security control management to influence residual 
risk management, one of the key drivers for the adoption of a metric programme is to be 
able to benchmark the organisation against industry peers. The framework must also allow 
the current state of effectiveness to be compared with previous states in order to determine 
improvement. 
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4. Framework positioning 
 
The framework must be positioned within the content of other standards or management 
frameworks an organisation may be compliant with and provide a method of filling the gap 





Figure 5 – Positioning of ISEF framework 
5. Contextually specific 
 
In order to give the metrics context, the measurements should be aligned against risks using 
the relationship that a control counters against a risk. The relationship between risks and 
controls is a many to many relationship. 
 
This helps eliminate the emotional and misdirected activities in security spending. Just as 
after a security incident an organisation can feel the need to direct resources to stop the 
type of incident occurring again even though greater risks exist, the same can occur with 
security metrics. An organisation may feel the need to direct resources to the most 
ineffective controls when they are actually only mitigating small risks. The greatest risk 
reduction per pound spent is on improving the effectiveness of controls mitigating the 
greatest risks. Alignment of security metrics against risks helps ensure this. 
 
6. Risk Management Alignment 
 
The framework should align against international standards for risk management processes. 
Although many risk management methods exist the majority adhere to the concept as 
outlined in ISO 27002. 
 
7. Quantitative scale 
 
In order to provide a method of modifying residual risk levels and overcome the subjective 
nature of a qualitative scale the framework should represent effectiveness on a quantitative 
scale. For the effectiveness measurements to be incorporated into risk assessment activities 
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8. Viewpoints 
 
As concepts and data can be complex to understand and interpretative one method of 
providing representing this information is through the use of viewpoints providing different 
levels of abstraction. 
 
The identified stakeholders requiring metric data during analysis were: 
 
 Organisation level (Management board) 
 Security Operations 
 IT Operations 
 
The framework should provide at minimum security metric information in a format suitable 
for these stakeholders. 
 
As our analysis has shown raw numerical data alone cannot provide the necessary 
information to make decisions on the effectiveness of security controls. The raw data needs 
to be transformed and enriched with contextual information for it to be more useful.  
 
9. Top-down metric definition 
 
In order to ensure collected metrics meet the purpose of the framework a top-down 
approach is required. While this has the disadvantage of potentially introducing additional 
costs in metric collection, this is worthwhile as it allows direct context to the measurements.  
 
 
In order to define a top-down approach the framework must align against organisational 
risks with the objective being to measure the effectiveness of controls used to mitigate a 
particular risk. 
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6 FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
6.1 BACKGROUND 
A commonly suggested method for measuring the effectiveness of a control is through 
measuring the absence of what the control is trying to prevent. For example it is commonly 
suggested that the effectiveness of anti-malware controls can be measured through the 
absence of any malware infections. This can either be through the absence of symptoms or 
through using another detection method to prove the absence of malware. This however 
requires the use of a trusted and proved malware detection method. Without a proven 
detection or measurement mechanism any attempts to measure the effectiveness of the 
preventative controls are flawed. 
 
This is especially true in high threat environments where attackers have the capability to 
hide their attacks and efforts to detect intrusions would be near impossible. Therefore 
measuring the absence of an attack does not prove that the preventative control has been 
effective. 
 
Another approach to measuring effectiveness is through the relationship that a control will 
be more effective if implemented correctly and as intended. As a controls implementation 
can be measured directly, this allows for actual repeatable measurements to be made for a 
control.  
 
When deciding a residual risk level, a risk reduction amount will be assigned to a particular 
control and will be based on the control being implemented as designed. For example, a 
firewall will reduce the risk of network attack only if it is implemented correctly. The 
framework uses the relationship between controls effectiveness and its correctness of 
implementation as the basis for its design. 
6.2 INFORMATION SECURITY EFFECTIVENESS FRAMEWORK 
Figure 6 - Framework v1.0 components shows the three components that make up the 




Figure 6 - Framework v1.0 components 
The metric definition process makes use of supporting tables, Table 5 and Table 6 to help 
define the baseline metrics used within the visualisation model.  
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The framework is designed to be used in conjunction with risk management activities and 
requires a number of outputs from this process as shown in Figure 7 - Framework input and 
outputs. 
 
Figure 7 - Framework input and outputs 
6.2.1 METRIC DEFINITION PROCESS 
In order to define a metric the specific security characteristics that will be measured must 
also be defined.  The framework suggests a three step process for defining a metric. Firstly 
the control being measured must be assigned a control group, and then based on the 
identified group the framework defines the specific characteristics to be measured. Once the 
characteristics have been identified the metrics can be specified according to the 
organisations security policy that has been used for the basis of the original risk assessment. 
STEP 1 - CONTROL GROUPING 
Due to the vast number of security controls currently deployed within organisations and 
with new controls being constantly developed, it would be impractical to try and define a set 
of metrics for each possible security control that could exist. 
 
In order for the framework to still provide practical guidance it recommends a set of 
characteristics inherent in different types of controls that can be measured. One problem 
arising from this method is how to group security controls in a way that the group has 
common characteristics that can be measured. 
 
There a numerous control groupings within national and international security standards 
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The framework uses the method of grouping controls based on the following categories as 






Classifying the security control as a member of one of the above groups still does not 
provide enough granularity to provide generic characteristics whilst still producing a 
meaningful metric. For example, the use of Anti-virus and a firewall are both technical 
controls however they have quite different variables that can be measured to determine 
their effectiveness. 
 
In order to suggest a more granular classification the security control can be aligned with 
objective from the following categories based on a temporal variable [WRIGHT08]. 
 
 Preventative – A control that attempts to stop security incidents from occurring 
 Detective – A control that identifies a security incidents has occurred 
 Corrective – A control that attempts to reverse the effects and/or causes of a 
security incident 
 
This allows a control matrix with the previous categories as axis. Figure Table 5 – Security 
control placement shows the matrix illustrated with example security controls. 
 
 Procedural  Technical Physical 
Preventative Personnel Vetting Firewall Guard force 
Detective  Anti-virus Burglar Alarm 
Corrective  Backup  
Table 5 – Security control placement with examples 
For example, using this method a firewall is a preventative technical control whereas a 
building security alarm is a detective physical control. 
STEP 2 - METRIC CHARACTERISTICS 
In order to identify common characteristics a number of national and international 
standards were consulted and controls analysed.  
 
Specific questions were included within the interview session with industry peers in order to 
identify the specific properties they focused on when performing security reviews.  
 
During the interview sessions, participants were asked what questions they asked when 
deciding if a control has been correctly implemented and these can be grouped into the 
following four questions: 
 
 Is the control configured in line with policy? 
 Is the control updated in line with policy? 
 Has the control responded in time as defined in policy? 
 Does the control cover all the elements it should? 
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From these questions the following characteristics were identified as common 
characteristics for a control: 
 
 Configuration  
 Currency 
 Timeliness 
 Coverage  
 
These characteristics are then aligned with the different control groups. This is illustrated 
with the following example. 
 
Once the control is categorised, Table 6 is used as a lookup to determine the characteristics 
to be measured. 
 
For example, a network firewall is a preventative technical control. Using Table 6 the 
coverage and configuration characteristics of the firewall should be used in defining the 
metrics. 
 
 Procedural  Technical Physical 
Preventative Coverage Coverage 
Configuration 
Coverage 










Table 6 – Control characteristics 
STEP 3 – SPECIFY METRIC 
One of the design criteria identified was that the effectiveness metric must be a quantitative 
value, ideally expressed as a percentage.  In order to measure the effectiveness of a control 
as a percentage its fully effective state must be known.  
 
A controls fully effective state (in terms of risk reduction) is the original state that is defined 
in a formal individual security policy or defined in system documentation, and is the basis for 
the original risk assessment. The original risk treatment assumes the control will be 
deployed in line with a set policy or design for an appropriate risk reduction to be claimed. It 
is against this specific policy or design that the characteristic must be measured against. 
 
To illustrate using an anti-malware control the grouping places it as a technical preventative 
control and specifies Coverage, Currency and Configuration as the characteristics of the 
implementation to be measured. In order to phrase the metric in a way that can be 
measured details from the security policy are required. The security policy may state that all 
computer workstations must have a specific anti-malware control installed, configured to 
update every hours and must perform a full system scan at midnight. Using the specific 
requirements from the security policy a metric can be defined for each characteristic.  
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Anti-malware: 
 
 Coverage metric - What percentage of computer workstations have the anti-
malware control installed? 
 
 Currency – What percentage of anti-malware controls have been updated within the 
last two hours? 
 
 Configuration – What percentage of anti-malware controls are configured to 
perform a full system scan at midnight? 
 
If these characteristics are not defined in the security policy or do not exist then they should 
be defined as they will be required to gain full use of the control as well as providing a 
baseline for measurement. 
 
The outcome of the metric must be a percentage of the overall fully effective state to allow 
the metric to be used to modify residual risk levels. 
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6.2.2 METRIC VISUALISATION SCHEME 
The understanding of metric data has been identified as an issue with realising the benefits 
of the data and importantly using this data to inform decisions such as direction of security 
investment. 
 
For this reason, the framework has been designed to provide a number of viewpoints that 
are strongly connected and aligned with the risk management process. These viewpoints can 
otherwise be known as information dashboards. 
 
The three viewpoints representing the different identified stakeholders for metric data are: 
 
 Organisation level (Management board) – Risk based view 
 Security Operations – Security control view 
 IT Operations – Security metric view 
 
VIEWPOINT CREATION 
Research by Haber and McNabb [HAB1] resulted in a visualisation reference model that 
suggests a number of transformations must be performed on raw data to convert the data 
into a format for human consumption. The process includes data enrichment and 
visualisation mapping. 
 
This process is useful to use in creating a number of viewpoints as different levels of data 
enrichment can provide different viewpoints. In the security metrics space, the 
transformation of enriching metrics with security control requirements can provide the 
security practitioner with metrics aligned with the organisations control catalogue. Further 

















Metric A Metric B Metric C
Control A Control B




Table 7 - Data enrichment 
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The framework uses the process of data enrichment in order to provide the different 
viewpoints indentified. This process also meets the previous requirement to give security 
metrics context. 
 


















































Unauthorised access to sensitive data on 
lost assets
Unauthorised access to sensitive data on 
corporate systems by external parties








Percentage of external network connections 






































Reporting and Visualisation Framework
 
Figure 8 – Reporting and visualisation concepts 
METRIC VIEW 
The metric viewpoint will have an entry for every metric defined in the metric definition 
process. This could be a number of metrics per control. 
 
As the metric view provides information regarding the specific information the metrics this 
viewpoint uses a grid format. The metric viewpoint is designed for the entry and 
management of metric information rather than visualisation. For this reason a simple 
spreadsheet format is used to facilitate this. 
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Percentage of external network connections 






















Figure 9 - Metric viewpoint 
CONTROL VIEW 
In order to provide a control viewpoint the relationship between controls and metrics must 
be used to aggregate the many characteristic metrics for one control together to provide an 
overall control effectiveness. The control view takes the average for all of the controls 
metrics and displays the effectiveness on a circular visual using green and red colour coding 
to allow the viewer to see at a glance the overall effectiveness of the entire control 
catalogue. 
 
In order to provide one effectiveness value for a control, the average of its metrics is 
calculated. This has been chosen due to the time constraints of the project not allowing 
research into the importance of some characteristics over others. For example, the coverage 
characteristic of a control may possibly provide more risk reduction than its configuration 
and therefore should be weighting in calculating the controls effectiveness value. This is 








Figure 10 – Control viewpoint item 
RISK VIEW 
Using the data enrichment model of producing the different viewpoints, it is important that 
the higher level views display the data in a simple visualisation without losing the extra data 
included as part of the enrichment process. 
 
The framework is designed to view two sets of data on one visualisation. Figure 11 - 
Organisational view shows the total risk carried by an organisation as a wheel graphic. The 
wheel is divided up into smaller segments representing the different security risks present 
within the organisation. The size of the risk segment is proportionate to the risk share of the 
total risk value. The risk value can be calculated used any risk assessment methodology 
provided that the ratio of the risks value is known. 
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Equation 1 – Calculating risk share 
The colour of each risk segment displays the current effectiveness of the controls 
implemented to counter the specific risk. By overlaying colour on the risk wheel, risk share 
and effectiveness can be displayed on one graphic. The use of colour is not imperative and in 
some scenarios due to colour blindness an alternative scheme may be required. The 
importance is on the overlay of an additional variable by colour, shading or pattern to 
identify differing effectiveness values. 
 
The choice of threshold level should be modified to meet the specific risk appetite of the 
organisation. For example, if an effectiveness of 90% would increase the residual risk over 
the organisations risk appetite then the threshold for Green would be 90-100%. From the 
case study performed in chapter 8, the thresholds stated in Table 8 are a starting point from 
which the thresholds can be tailored. 
 
 
Aggregated Control Effectiveness Colour 
0 – 80% Red 
80 – 95% Amber 
95 – 100% Green 
Table 8 – Suggested risk wheel colourings 
This alignment of two security variables allows organisations to make more informed 
decisions on where to focus remedial efforts. For example, if the controls mitigating two 
risks are both operating at a low effectiveness the organisation may wish to focus efforts on 
improving the controls which counter the largest risk. This allows a greater overall risk 






Unauthorised modification of financial data by 
external parties
Segment size is 
proportionate to the size 
of the assessed risk. The 
larger the segment, the 
larger the risk.
Colour of segment 
represents the 
effectiveness of the 
controls mitigating the 
risk






Figure 11 - Organisational view 
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6.2.3 EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISON INDEX 
In order to benchmark organisations against each other the measurement of the 
effectiveness needs to be made against a common scale. Comparisons could be made at the 
control level but not all organisations employ the same controls therefore making like for 
like comparison difficult. 
 
If one organisation is better at configuration management than another then does this 
equate to a more effective security management regime? As with all areas of security it 
depends on how important configuration management is to that organisation. Therefore all 
security metrics need to be compared in context to its importance.  
 
In order for comparisons to be made at a meaningful level, the control effectiveness 
measurements must be aggregated to give an organisational effectiveness level and aligned 
against a scale that can be compared between organisations. 
 
One common security variable that exists across all organisations is risk, therefore the 
effectiveness of security procedures can be redefined as the organisations effectiveness at 
reducing risk to information assets. Using risk as a common scale allows the differing 
importance of security controls between organisations to be factored into the overall 
measurement.  
 
One field that has matured in the use of numerical data for benchmarking is the financial 
markets. Here investors and commercial companies require a method of comparing and 
identifying the performance of a particular market or set of companies such as the 
technology sector.  
 
In response to this need the financial markets use indexes to report the current performance 
of a market. The structure and composition of these indexes have matured to incorporate a 
number of factors that influence a market’s performance. The primary indicator of a 
company’s performance is the current price of its shares and the sum of the entire 
company’s share price within a particular sector gives an indication of the performance of 
the market as a whole. As indexes became more popular they became more developed in 
providing a more accurate indicator by incorporating additional data such as market share. 
This led to the development of market-share weighted indices that weight an organisations 
current stock price by its market share. This is statistically known as a Composite Index as it 
combines a number of variables [FRANCIS04].  
 
A composite index means that small changes in stock prices of organisations with a larger 
market share have a larger impact on the overall index [NASDAQ05]. This is shown 
mathematically in Equation 2 – FTSE NASDAQ equation.  
 
Within the information security space a similar property is desirable when determining the 
overall effectiveness of security management. Controls that reduce high impact risks are 
naturally more important than controls that reduce against small impacts at an 
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FTSE NASDAQ Index =   
Equation 2 – FTSE NASDAQ equation 
n = number of securities in the Index 
p = price – the latest trade price of the component security 
s = shares in issue (defining the size of the security) 
d = divisor – a figure that represents the total issued share capital of the Index 
 
The framework suggests modelling an effectiveness index on a composite index used by the 
financial markets. In using this model the market-share weighting is replaced with the risk 
share for a particular information security risk. The current stock market price for a 
particular company is replaced with the current effectiveness value. As the risk share value is 
calculated as a percentage of the overall risk share, the sum off all risks will total 100. As this 
is a static total there is no need for the divisor property to normalise the Index. This property 
is important as it allows indices with different number of risks to still be compared. 
 
Effectiveness Index  
Equation 3 – Effectiveness index equation 
n = the total number of risks in the Index 
e = effectiveness of controls implemented to mitigate a risk 
r = risk share value 
By representing the overall effectiveness as a single numerical value it allows the data to be 
plotted against time and trends in risk exposure to be identified as shown in Figure 12 - 
Example use of effectiveness index. The use of a single numerical value also allows 
organisations to share index values without having to reveal specific security control 
information.  
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6.3 RESIDUAL RISK MODIFICATION 
In order to gain a better understanding of an organisations residual risk, the effectiveness 
measurements need to be incorporated into the risk assessment activities. The framework is 
designed to represent effectiveness measurements as a percentage which allows them to be 
incorporated into any risk assessment methodology.  
 
Where a risk reduction is being claimed for a particular control, this risk reduction needs to 
be modified appropriately depending on its current effectiveness measurement. Figure 13 
shows a worked example for a firewall control operating at 57% effectiveness. The risk 
assessment scale used is a basic 0 - 10 with a risk reduction of 7 points on this scale for a 
firewall.  
Initial Risk Level 
assessed as 9
Residual Risk 




k Firewall gives a 
risk reduction of 













Firewall gives a 
risk reduction of 
7 * 57%  = 4
Before effectiveness measurements After effectiveness measurements
0
10
Figure 13 – Incorporation of effectiveness measurements into risk assessment activities 
For a quantitative risk assessment scale the incorporation of a percentage effectiveness can 
be completed in one step, however for a qualitative scale, the levels must be converted into 
a numerical scale for the effectiveness to be applied. For example, using a scale of [Very 
High, High, Medium, Low, Very Low] would require converting to a [5, 4, 3, 2, 1] scale before 
the incorporating the effectiveness measurement. 
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7 PROTOTYPE TOOL 
7.1 SUPPORTING FRAMEWORK TOOL 
In order to support effectiveness visualisation, a prototype tool was developed. The tool was 
used during a case study to evaluate the framework. The tool was developed in VB.net and 
uses the Microsoft charting components to support the visualisations. 
 
The tool provides three viewpoints and implements the visualisation scheme of the 
framework and can be accessed from the tool start page as shown in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14 – Start page 
Figure 15 shows the tools implementation of the risk viewpoint. 
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Figure 15 – Risk viewpoint 
Figure 16 shows the entire control catalogue and a breakdown of the controls effectiveness.  
 
 
Figure 16 – Control viewpoint 
Figure 17 – Metric viewpoint shows the metric viewpoint allowing the entry of metric 
measurements. 
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Figure 17 – Metric viewpoint 
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8 EVALUATION 
8.1 CASE STUDY 
The proposed framework was tested within a UK central government department and a 
small sized business between June and July 2009. As the testing of the framework involves 
details of the security posture of an organisation, the conditions of the case study require 
the project to provide anonymity to the department and business in question. 
 
The aim of the case study was to compare how the framework performed within 
organisations that have differing levels of risk management maturity, security resources and 
risk governance structures to determine areas of weakness that could be explored as further 
work. 
 
In the case study the following observations were made: 
 
Metric definition process 
The frameworks process for defining characteristics to be measured was largely a straight 
forward task for both organisations. The only area of difficulty was deciding if a control was 
either a detective or preventative control. There are a number of controls that can fit into 
either category so the characteristics of both types were measured. 
 
Expense of metric collection 
As expected, due to the top-down design of the metric definition process there is a 
minimum expense in collecting metrics. This was more problematic for the small sized 
business than the government department. This was not due to the size of security team 
available but rather the use of configuration management services employed by the 
government department. Data required for the measurement of coverage and configuration 
characteristics were already available due to the configuration management service where 
as this information required manual collection in the small business. 
 
Availability of framework data 
In the government department a defined risk portfolio allowed metrics to be quickly 
defined. This did not exist in the small business so a considerable amount of initial work to 
define these was required. The framework has a high dependency for risk management 
information, and without only the metrics viewpoint was able to be populated. The process 




The process of benchmarking and the use of the information security effectiveness index 
proved more beneficial to the government department as it allowed comparison amongst 
departmental sections to identify areas of the organisation that were at higher risk. This was 
less of a benefit to the small sized business as the organisation was too small to perform 
analysis between business sections. 
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STRENGTHS 
While other IT management standards do include less detailed effectiveness measurements 
they do not always align with a risk management methodology and take into account 
security characteristics. In contrast the framework has been designed from the outset to 
align itself with risk management methodologies defined in leading security management 
standards such as ISO27002. 
 
For organisations that have an identified risk and control portfolio the framework proved 
simple to populate and the information presented in a way that was comparable with other 
risk management activities. 
 
The framework provides a method of benchmarking organisations and as the method is 
independent of the controls implemented, this allows for comparison of organisations that 
implement different controls. 
WEAKNESSES 
The full benefit of the framework proved difficult to be realised by an organisation that does 
not have a mature risk management regime. The framework relies on having a defined risk 
and control portfolio that is not common place in small to medium-sized organisations.  
 
It was found that the framework can be resource intensive to initially populate and update 
with these resources not always available in small to medium-sized organisations. 
 
COMPARISON 
In response to the identified business issues and gap in current standards, the framework 
facilitates with the definition, visualisation and comparison on security metrics. A 
comparison of the ISEF against other standards and tools researched is shown in Table 9. The 
case studies using the ISEF have shown that the framework provides assistance in these 
goals where other management standards and governance models do not. 
 
 ISO27004 NIST COBIT ITIL STREAM ITSAT ISEF 
Programme 
management 
Y Y Y Y    
Reporting  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Visualisation     Y Y Y 
Effectiveness 
Benchmarking 
      Y 
Metric 
Definition 
      Y 
Table 9 – ISEF compared with other standards and models 
The ISEF is positioned appropriately to complement other IT management standards such as 
COBIT and ISO27004 and does not create an unnecessary overlap. The framework uniquely 
visualises security metrics in the context of an organisational risk to allow modification of 
current residual risk levels. 
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9 CONCLUSION 
In summary, this project aimed to identify the current business issues surrounding the use of 
security metrics and develop a framework that helps organisations resolve these issues.  The 
following section describes how these aims were met. 
 
Identify the current business issues around preventing organisations producing security 
metrics 
 
The project conducted a number of interviews and successfully identified 9 main business 
issues surrounding the use of security metrics. The ISEF was designed to help with 7 of these 
issues. 
 
Identify and analyse the current information, tools and methodologies that currently exist 
to produce security metrics 
 
A literature review was conducted and identified an absence in current standards and tools 
for how metrics should be defined, visualised and compared. This review correlated with the 
issues identified during the interview process and formed the requirements for the ISEF. 
 
Propose a framework that helps define, visualise and compare security metrics 
 
The project has proposed the ISEF including 3 tools that help with the definition of security 
metrics, visualisation of metric data and a method for comparing security metrics. The 
framework was evaluated and results show that the ISEF can make a significant contribution 
to these activities. 
 
Design and develop a security metrics reporting tool based on the framework 
 
The ISEF was implemented as an information dashboard created in VB.net. The application 
provided a graphical user interface for a backend database containing the metric data and 
the risk, control, metric relationships. 
 
9.1 FURTHER WORK 
Control Catalogue 
In order to make the framework more accessible to smaller organisations it would be 
beneficial to have a predefined risk and control catalogue that can be used while the risk 
management regime is improved. Although this does introduce the danger of the framework 
being used indefinitely without aligning it with the organisations security requirements and 
the full benefits not being realised.   
 
Additional characteristics 
To make the measurement of effectiveness more accurate, research into additional control 
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Due to the time constraints of this project, the ISEF calculates controls effectiveness as the 
average of the controls metrics. If two characteristics are measured for a control, for 
example coverage and configuration, the average of the two is used as the controls 
effectiveness value. While this provides a simple aggregation method, some characteristics 
may be more important to risk reduction than others and therefore should be weighted in 
the measurement aggregation. The ISEF could be improved by conducting research into the 
importance of different characteristics in risk reduction. 
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